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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Lewis Becker is in agreement with the Statement of the Case as set forth by 
Farmers National Bank in the Appellant's Brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court correctly interpreted LC. § 45-1802 as creating a lien on 
agricultural products that extends to livestock that consume the agricultural products with 
priority over competing security interests. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondent Lewis Becker claims attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-
1809. This section provides that in an action to enforce an agricultural commodity dealer's lien 
"The court shall also, as part of the cost, allow the moneys paid for filing and recording the claim, 
and a reasonable attorney's fee for each person claiming a lien." A successful lien claimant is 
therefore entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees by statute. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The plain language of the statute evidences the legislature's intent that the lien created by 
LC.§ 45-1802 attaches to livestock. 
Under Idaho law statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. 
The words are given their plain, usual and ordinary meanings, and where a statute is 
unambiguous "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect and the 
court need not consider rules of statutory construction." State Dept. of Health and Welfare v. 
Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439 (2008). If a statute is ambiguous, it is the duty of the court to use 
statutory construction to determine the intent of the legislature. State v. Yzaguirre, l 44 Idaho 
471, 475 (2007). A statute is ambiguous when the language of the statute is capable of more 
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than one reasonable construction. Id.; Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 
804 (2006). 
The relevant language of the agricultural lien statute is contained in I.C. § 45-1802. This 
statute reads as follows: 
An agricultural commodity producer or an agricultural commodity dealer who 
sells, or delivers under contract or bailment, an agricultural product has a lien on 
the agricultural product or the proceeds of the sale of the agricultural product as 
provided in section 45-1804, Idaho Code. The lien created in this chapter may 
attach regardless of whether the purchaser uses the agricultural product purchased 
to increase the value of his livestock or whether he uses the agricultural product 
purchased to maintain the value, health or status of his livestock without actually 
increasing the value of his agricultural product. 
The second sentence of this statute was added in a statutory amendment in 1989. See 
IDAHO SESSION LAWS 1989, c. 299. The plain language of this amendment implies that the 
legislature intended for the lien to attach to livestock that consume agricultural products. The 
sentence addresses how the purchaser of the agricultural products "uses" those products with 
regard to his livestock. It states that the lien attaches regardless of whether the use of the 
products increases or maintains the value of the livestock. While the sentence does not explicitly 
state that the lien "may attach" to the livestock, it implies that the lien attaches to livestock 
whether it increases the value of the livestock or only maintains the value of the livestock. 
Contrary to the suggestions of Farmers National Bank, implication and inference are permissible 
means of discerning the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute. The goal of statutory 
interpretation "is to give effect to the purpose of the statute and the legislative intent in enacting 
it, which may be implied from the language used or inferred on grounds of policy or 
reasonableness." The Senator, Inc. v. Ada County Bd. of Equalization, 138 Idaho 566, 570 
(2003); State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 184 (2008). The sentence added by the amendment 
would make little sense if not understood to imply that the lien attaches to livestock because the 
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verb "used" in the context of the sentence clearly refers to feeding the products to livestock. 
There would be no reason for the 1 egislature to discuss how the products are "used" if the lien 
only attached to agricultural products before they were fed to livestock, and was extinguished as 
soon as the livestock consumed the products. 
Farmers National Bank argues that the second sentence serves to clarify the first sentence 
by stating that the lien will attach to the feed regardless of how the purchaser uses the feed. 
Farmers cites Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731 (1998) as providing an example of a 
statutory amendment that serves only to clarify an existing statute. In Stonecipher, the 
legislature clarified an existing statute by providing a list of illustrative examples of an action to 
collect child support arrearages. In contrast, the 1989 amendment to LC. § 45-1802 as 
interpreted by Farmers clarifies nothing. Under Farmers' interpretation, the lien exists only so 
long as the feed has not been used. Whether a purchaser uses feed to increase the value of 
livestock or to maintain it is not pertinent to a lien that exists only so long as the feed is unused. 
The references to "livestock" certainly do nothing to clarify that the lien only attaches to 
agricultural products before they are used as feed, as Farmers contends. Farmers' interpretation 
that the statutory amendment serves only to clarify the statute is not reasonable. 
The Idaho Dairymen's Association as amicus curiae argues that the District Court's 
reading is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. The Association argues that the subject of 
the second sentence of LC. § 45-1802 is "the lien created in this chapter," the remainder of the 
sentence does nothing to modify this subject, and therefore the lien remains the same as the lien 
created by the original 1983 statute. This argument is circular. The question at issue in this case 
is the nature of the "lien created in this chapter." It cannot be presumed that the "lien created in 
this chapter" is one that only applies to unused animal feed and therefore the intent of the 
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legislature in enacting the amendment was to create only a lien that applies to animal feed. The 
intent of the legislature must be discerned from the plain meaning of LC. § 45-1802 as amended, 
or if ambiguous must be determined by external evidence. 
The Dairymen's Association further argues that the District Court's interpretation is 
inconsistent with the remainder of the Act because other sections of the Act make no reference to 
liens attaching to livestock. The Association points out that the definition of "agricultural 
product" in LC. § 45-1801 does not refer to livestock, that I.C. §§ 45-1803, 45-1804, and 45-
1805 make no mention of livestock, and faults the District Comi for focusing primarily on LC. 
§ 45-1802 and not on other sections of the Act. This argument ignores the fact that it was LC. 
§ 45-1802 that was amended in 1989 and that it is the interpretation of that section that is in 
dispute. The legislature presumably intended to change the meaning of the statute when it was 
amended. See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 883 (2009). The district court focused on 
§ 45-1802 because its task was to determine the purpose of the amendment, and how the 
amendment affected the meaning of the statute as a whole. Moreover, the reliance of the 
Association on supposedly conflicting provisions of the original 1983 act is misplaced. 
Amendment of an act operates as a repeal of provisions of the amended act which are changed 
by and repugnant to the amendatory act. See 73 AM.1UR.2D Statutes § 284 (2012). The 
amendment calls into question the continued vitality of any conflicting provisions of the original 
act. 
B. Policy considerations support the District Court's interpretation that the lien attaches to 
livestock that consume agricultural products. 
The plain language of a statute forms the basis for interpretation of an unambiguous 
legislative act, but in the event a statute is found to be ambiguous external evidence and public 
policy become relevant to determine legislative intent. Thompson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 
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4 73 (2002); State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178 (2008). While the District Court concluded that I.C. 
§ 45-1802 is unambiguous, policy considerations support the District Court's interpretation even 
if the statute is in fact ambiguous. 
Lien statutes are "liberally construed "with a view to effect their objects and promote 
justice." Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 895 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
First Security Bank of Idaho, 94 Idaho 489, 493 (1971)). Statutory liens are remedial in nature 
and their purpose is "to provide protection to laborers and materialmen who have added directly 
to the value of the property of another by their materials or labor." Id. In the case of an 
agricultural commodities lien statute, the evident purpose of the statute is to protect farmers and 
dealers who sell feed to livestock operations. If farmers do not have some assurance of payment 
for the feed they sell, they will have less incentive to sell their products on credit to be used as 
feed for livestock, and livestock operations will have more difficulty obtaining feed. If a dairy 
farm or other livestock operation cannot obtain adequate feed, its livestock will not produce 
livestock products or offspring and will not maintain their value. The agricultural commodities 
producers and dealers "[add] directly to the value of the property of another" by providing the 
materials livestock owners need to "maintain" or "increase" the value of their livestock. This 
also explains why the legislature would provide for the statutory lien to take priority over a 
competing security interest in I.C. § 45-1805. If the lien did not take priority over a competing 
security interest, it would be of little value because in the event of a default the seller of livestock 
feed could never get paid unless the bank's loan was paid in full. Granting higher priority to the 
lien provides an incentive for suppliers to provide the inputs necessary for the livestock operation 
to stay in business. It is reasonable to infer that the legislature intended to protect the interests of 
farmers who provide feed to owners oflivestock, and that its 1989 amendment was intended to 
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ensure that the lien would attach to the livestock or to livestock products regardless of how the 
feed was used. 
The Idaho Dairymen's Association argues that interpreting the statute to provide for the 
lien to attach to livestock would undermine "the certainty required for financing dairy 
operations." Amicus Curiae 's Brief of the Idaho Dairymen's Association at l 0. This argument 
fails to consider that notice of the agricultural commodity dealer's lien may be filed with the 
secretary of state under LC.§ 45-1804. This provides notice to other creditors of the existence of 
the lien and allows them to take account of its existence. Moreover, it is within the power of the 
legislature to prefer the interests of one group of creditors over another, and legislatures routinely 
do so. Statutory liens exist to protect particular groups of creditors, such as laborers or local 
businesses that provide goods or services on credit. These lien statutes often grant priority over 
competing security interests of financial institutions. See, e.g., LC.§ 45-303(2) (granting priority 
to farm laborer's liens); LC. § 45-304(2) (granting priority to seed liens); LC. § 45-806 (granting 
priority to liens for repairs on personal property). Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
recognizes that statutory agricultural liens may be granted priority over prior perfected security 
interests, provided that the liens are "perfected" to provide notice to other creditors, including 
holders of security interests. 1 See I.C. § 28-9-322(g). If granting priority to agricultural liens 
completely undermines the system of commercial financing this apparently escaped the attention 
of the drafters of Article 9, and of the legislatures of other states that provide for agricultural 
liens to attach to livestock and grant these liens super-priority by statute. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 
§ 514.945; N.D. CENT.CODE § 35-31-0 l; TEX. CODE ANN.§ 188.002; KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 58-243; 
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 29-8-104. 
1 The Association's argument that the agricultural liens of Sellers were unperfected is addressed below. 
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C. The issue of whether the agricultural liens of the Sellers were perfected under the 
Uniform Commercial Code was not raised before the District Court and is therefore waived. 
The Idaho Dairymen's Association argues that the Respondent's agricultural liens were 
not perfected under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and therefore do not have 
priority over the security interest of Farmers National Bank. This issue was not raised or argued 
before the trial court and is therefore waived for purposes of this appeal. See Krempasky v. Nez 
Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 236 (2010). 
If this issue is not deemed to be waived, it should be noted that contrary to the arguments 
of the Association filing a financing statement is not necessarily required to perfect a lien for 
purposes of Article 9. The Uniform Commercial Code requires agricultural liens to be 
"perfected" in order to have priority granted to them by a lien statute. LC. § 28-9-322(g). In 
Stockman Bank of Montana v. Mon-Kata, Inc., 343 Mont. 115, 180 P.3d 1125 (2008), the 
Montana Supreme Court considered whether an agricultural lien claimant's lien had been 
perfected under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The lien claimant had not filed a 
UCC financing statement, but had filed a notice of lien with the Secretary of State as required by 
the agricultural lien statute. The Montana court concluded that this notice of lien was sufficient 
to perfect a lien under Article 9 because it contained the same information required on a 
financing statement and it was filed in the same office. Requiring lien claimants to file a UCC 
financing statement in addition to the notice of lien would be an unnecessary formality because 
the notice function had already been served by the notice of lien. Id at 132-33. By this standard, 
all of the Respondent's lien claims have been perfected by the filing of a notice of lien under LC. 
§ 45-1804. 
The related argument that LC. § 45-1805 does not grant priority over security interests to 
liens in livestock likewise addresses an issue that was not raised or argued before the District 
IO 
Court and is therefore waived. Even if this issue were properly before the Court this argument is 
without merit. Idaho Code § 45-1805 establishes the priority of "the lien created by section 45-
1802, Idaho Code." The interpretation of LC. § 45-1802 controls the interpretation of LC. § 45-
1805. Whatever lien is created by LC. § 45-1802 is granted priority over a competing security 
interest by LC. § 45-1805. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Amended Judgment entered by the District Court on 
August 29, 2012 should be affirmed. 
,_ 
Dated thisdJ_ day of December, 2012. 
WHITE PETERSON 
s 
Attorneys for Lewis Becker 
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